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There is, then, ground for regarding public opinion as an "atmosphere."
Tocqueville's metaphor, that it is a "sort of enormous pressure of the mind of
all upon the individual intelligence," goes far toward explaining the general
contours of American political Life. Legislators and judges certainly can sense
this atmosphere, as can members of minority groups who find themselves up
against majority sentiment. Key would probably not cavil at this notion, but
he would say that if we are satisfied with theories at Tocquevile's level of
generality we are too easily contented. For any atmosphere is a compound
composed of many elements, and we are obliged to identify them and under-
stand their interaction. In pursuit of this end, Key's Public Opinion and Amer-
ican Democracy is a major contribution and is bound to be the standard work
in the field for many years to come. Yet even he, in his final chapter, is
forced to conclude that the atmosphere of American life is not altogether
healthy. Public opinion, political and social, is not what we would like it to be
or what it is capable of becoming. "[T]he masses do not corrupt themselves;
if they are corrupt [it is because] they have been corrupted . . . [by] . . .
the stupidity and self-seeking of leadership echelons." 10 This is, in a nutshall, a
theory. It is also a call to put things right. And in ending on a note such as
this, Key is in the best tradition of Western political thought.
ANDREW HACKERt
WHO GOVERNS? By Robert A. Dahl. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1961. Pp. xii, 355. $7.50.
IN Who Governs? Professor Dahl, chairman of the Political Science De-
partment at Yale, makes important contributions to a surprising range of
subjects. Academicians who shelve their books by subject matter can give it
an important place in their political theory collection, a prominent position
on their methodology shelf, or put it among the few really important com-
munity studies. Non-academicians can read it for insight into New England
history, acculturation of immigrants, nature of political power, or problems of
urban redevelopment. And a few lowbrows will doubtless seize on it as a sort
of political Peyton Place that "tells all" about New Haven politics. It has much
to say about all these things, and more.
The study of urban government has long been one of those academic
underdeveloped areas with which political science is so well endowed. But
no longer can one brush the subject off with a passing reference to the law of
been reshaped by legislation and other governmental instruments. However, in most signif-
icant instances the political system, in the United States at least, responds to the needs
of dominant interests in society. Key came close to saying as much in two chapters in an
early edition of his textbook. See The Role of Force and Education ds Politics, PoLrics,
PARTIES, AND PRnssum Gaoups 619-41, 642-60 (2d ed. 1948).
10. Pp. 557-58. . .
tAssociate Professor of Government, Cornell University..-
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municipal corporations. Over the past decade social scientists have moved to
the study of local communities as miniature "political systems", and are be-
ginning to note that collections of governments in a metropolitan area bear
some resemblance to international organizations. In 1953 Floyd Hunter's con-
troversial book 1 provided both a simple method-"reputational analysis"--
and a provocative thesis-the economic elite rule-for those concerned with
urban politics. Fortunately the ensuing fad for "research" based on what a
lawyer would term hearsay evidence, from unqualified experts, on hypothetical
questions, is now yielding to solidly researched, historically based studies such
as Who Governs?.
But why study the politics of one city? Professor Dahl suggests that, in
addition to its relevance to residents of the New Haven area, readers "may gain
a greater understanding of their own communities, American politics, or even
democracy itself." 2 Hence it seems appropriate to consider the book first as an
analysis of New Haven, then for the light it sheds on other American cities,
and finally as a contribution to our general understanding of how "pluralistic
democracy" works. This reviewer puts particular emphasis on the second of
these objectives: the problem of comparing various urban political systems.
By 1960 there were 130 American cities (not metropolitan areas, but legal
cities) of over 100,000 population.3 Over fifty million Americans live within
these 130 cities, but there are only 152,048 souls accounted for by New Haven
(which has slipped to 81st in size). Rightly or wrongly, many readers will be
more concerned with "who governs" in some of the 129 other major cities 4
than in the trials and tribulations of Mayor Richard Lee.
First, then, who governs in New Haven? Dahl's answer comes in two main
parts, one broadly historical and the other concentrating on the past decade. In
the early nineteenth century there was little question as to who "ran" things.
The old Federalist-Congregational elite combined economic, political, and social
leadership. Up to 1842 the mayors were almost always "patricians," drawn from
law and the professions. Voting took place under a "stand up law" such that
opposition to the elite became a matter of public knowledge. As long as the
city remained relatively small (barely 12,000 by 1840) and growth was
moderate, the oligarchy continued in power.
But the old patricians did not adjust to the increasingly industrial times.
From 1840 to 1860 the city population more than tripled, and after 1842 the
mayors were usually entrepreneurs, not from the old elite but self-made men.
This shift in leadership would seem to accord both with the spirit of the times
(pre-Civil War Whiggery and the post-Civil War "gilded age") as well as
with the era of rapid growth for the city. By 1900 New Haven had a popula-
1. CoMMuxiTY PowER STRUCTURE (1953).
2. Id. at vii.
3. Census of Population, Supplementary Reports PC(Sl)-7, June 16, 1961.
4. Fortunately, a fifth of this total city population, living in New York City and
Chicago, has been well covered. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY
(1960) and BANFIELD, PO.TICAL INFLUENCE (1961).
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tion of 108,000, which put it substantially ahead of Los Angeles, Houston,
Dallas, Atlanta, Seattle, or Memphis (not to mention such villages as Miami
and Phoenix).
From 1899 on the mayors of New Haven have been neither patricians nor
tycoons, but what Dahi aptly terms "the ex-plebes," men from modest, lower
middle-class backgrounds, and of non-Yankee stock. This shift seems to have
been a much more common phenomenon in the northeast than the earlier break
between patricians and entrepreneurs. In Boston, for example, the patricians
seem to have taken to business (to banking, finance, and shipping rather than
to manufacturing) more successfully. But the Boston of The Late George
Apley eventually yielded to that of The Last Hurrah, and similar shifts have
been detailed for Holyoke 5 and Providence.6 Actually, the New Haven
Yankees appear to have been singularly uninventive in the area of politics: in
Boston the retreating Yankees vested substantial power over the city in a state
board (which they continued to control for decades), and in Holyoke the
Yankee upper-class capitalized on a scandal to regain control for a time, during
which they pushed through a non-partisan election system (which tends to
blunt the voting power of the lower classes).
Dahl summarizes the history of New Haven as a process of gradual dis-
persal of political resources. The pattern of cumulative inequalities which
prevailed in the days of the patricians has been replaced by one of dispersed
or non-cumulative inequalities. As one Holyoke resident phrased it in regard
to that city: "The Protestants have all the money and the Catholics have all
the votes." 7 In New Haven there is something of this plus an additional split,
apparently still evident, between sheer wealth and old-line social standing.8
The key problem of politics, to which Dahl returns in the last third of the
book, is how one resource base (wealth, or numbers, or social standing, or
what-not) can be mobilized to effect other resources.
But there is another splintering process which is strangely absent from
Dahl's description. This is the obvious and seemingly important fact that the
"New Haven" of 1840 or 1890 was an economic, social, and political entity
in and of itself. This, of course, is no longer the case. The economic and
social reality of the current generation is the "New Haven metropolitan area"
of 311,681 people; the central city of New Haven is just one of a variety
of legal jurisdictions. Thus the standard clich6 of public administration:
5. See Constance McLaughlin Green's brilliant but neglected book, HOLYOKE, MAS-
SACHUSETTS: A CASE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN AmERICA ch. IX (1939) ;
UNDERWOOD, PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC: RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION IN AN
INDUSTRIAL COmmUNITY (1958). Both, incidentally, were originally done as doctoral dis-
sertations at Yale.
6. Cornwell, Party Absorption of Ethnic Groups: The Case of Providence, Rhode
Island, 38 SOCIAL FORCES 205 (1960).
7. UNDERWOOD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 290.
8. This would seem peculiar to New England and, perhaps, the Deep South. The
obvious national pattern is for wealth to be convertible into social standing in one or at
most two generations.
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political control is "Balkanized" and does not accord with the integrated
economic and social area. One need not embrace the recommendations of the
administrators to perceive the political importance of divided jurisdictions.
This suggests a less optimistic interpretation of the New Haven data.
Perhaps the economic and social notables, far from having been worsted by
the ex-plebes, have merely withdrawn to their fortified positions in legally
independent suburbs (East Haven, North Haven, West Haven, Hamden, and
Woodbridge-all solidly Republican). Political control of a declining city
core is not an unalloyed joy. Data for the New Haven metropolitan area are
not readily available, but there is some suggestive material from Boston. There,
the shift in number of families listed in the Social Register with addresses
within the legal city and in the various suburbs was as follows :"
1894 1943
City of Boston .... 1,519 962
Boston Suburbs .... 403 1,993
The move to the suburbs has continued, and has involved not only the social
elite but most of the more prosperous middle class. Something of the same
process has occurred in New Haven (over the past decade its suburbs grew by
51.6 per cent while the city declined by 7.5 per cent). Except for their "down-
town" property most of the notables are thus safely removed from the legal
or political control of the ex-plebes. 10
The difference between an optimistic and a pessimistic view of New Haven
is even more evident when Dahl turns in Part II to deal with the extra-
ordinary events of the past decade. He examines in detail the different sets
of leaders and sub-leaders who have participated in decisions in three major
subject areas: (1) urban redevelopment, in which New Haven has had one of
the country's most ambitious programs; (2) public education, in which New
Haven had been lagging;"1 and (3) political party nominations. A simple
"power elite" theory might assume that the economic notables were making,
or decisively influencing, decisions in each of these areas. But Dahl indicates
that there has been relatively little overlap among participants in the three
areas, and especially among the social or economic elite. The most active
and consistently influential figure appears to be Mayor Richard Lee, an
"ex-plebe."
9. Firey, Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables, 10 Am. SOcIOLOGICAL REv.
140 (1945).
10. The shift to what Dahl terms "collective benefits" (the economists' "Public Goods"),
involves some items which are shared within an immediate neighborhood, others shared in a
whole subcommunity, and a few (e.g., smog control) necessarily shared over a whole metro-
politan area. Such key items as schools, most public services, and zoning do not have to be
shared with the central city ex-plebes.
11. While the New Haven city schools were in sad shape, one wonders what the level
of expenditures was in the wealthy suburbs.
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Professor Dahl credits Mayor Lee with great political skill and portrays him,
in almost Schumpeterian terms, as a highly successful "political en-
trepreneur." Obviously, Lee could not have carried out his far-reaching re-
development program without considerable bargaining skill. But is the New
Haven redevelopment story a sort of "miracle" to be attributed to a "great
man" theory of political leadership, or a more simple case of massive outside
funds serving as a sort of deus ex nmachina? Dahl leans to the former, but
to this reviewer New Haven appears as a sort of "Potemkin village."' 2 The
more emphasis one puts on the important and unusual resource base of federal
funds the less weight one need attach to the Mayor's particular talents. 3
The old point of Berle and Means about separation of ownership and control
would seem vital in accounting for the distribution of influence in New Haven
redevelopment. Mayor Lee was an ex-plebe, drawing only $18,000 a year as
mayor, yet calling the major decisions in meetings with most of the local
bankers, businessmen, and manufacturers. But (and I regard it as a crucial
"but") the mayor had under his control (not, of course, ownership, but
"control") almost fifty million dollars in federal redevelopment funds. The
relative scope of the program is touched on in one brief paragraph, 14 but the
amounts are never indicated, and the chapter dealing with "Cash, Credit, and
Wealth" as political resources concentrates on private wealth with only a
passing reference to "federal largesses."' 5 The following tabulation of the
specific projects, amounts granted or reserved, and dates of approval (cumu-
lated through September, 1961), is from the Congressional Record:16
Community renewal program .......... $ 247,333
Church Street ........................ 13,287,842 March 1956
Dixwell ............................. 7,865,654 July 1956
Oak Street .......................... 3,675,122 February 1951
Southwest area ...................... 4,800,000 March 1961
State St. renewal area ................ 2,317,000 February 1957
Wooster Square ...................... 15,514,851 December 1955
New Haven, total .................... $47,707,802 1951-1961
12. The physical structures in New Haven are real enough-unlike the facades put
up to fool Catherine the Great-but their "costless" financing makes the situation seem
highly artificial.
13. Thus in Newark, New Jersey, the mayor has been of secondary importance in the
redevelopment agency, and in Boston it would seem that Ed Logue (the former New
Haven development specialist) carries more weight than the neophyte mayor. The latter,
incidentally, seems to have won an upset victory because of the sense of alienation and
powerlessness of the Boston "ex-plebes" (who have non-partisan elections in a one-party
area). See LLvix, THE ALiENATFD VorTa (1960).
14. Pp. 121-22.
15. P. 244.
16. 108 CONG. REc. 2315 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1962).
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That Lee was able to win at least passing local fame out of such a federal
bonanza (about $323.00 per person) is hardly surprising. Even giving money
away requires a certain amount of talent (as foundation executives and foreign
aid administrators emphasize), but it is surely of a lesser order than negotiating
a major tax increase.17 Even in the school building program Lee was able
to build new schools by selling the strategically located old buildings to
affluent Yale (apparently at a somewhat padded price!). The tough problem
facing most mayors is of financing new schools while fixing up old ones, and
without benefit of Ivy League windfalls.
I would suggest two more crucial tests for "municipal statesmanship." One
is the ability to do something about the inter-governmental "jungle" of separ-
ate jurisdictions; the other is the ability to meet new public needs by diverting
funds from the private to the public sector.' 8 From the local point of view
federal or state aid may appear as "free goods" (in the economic sense) but
this just means that the test is being met at a higher level of government
(after the presumed failure of local leadership). In New Haven, Mayor Lee
has not done anything to meet either of these criteria.19 If he had led in the
creation of a metropolitan-wide jurisdiction, with power to tax the rich Yankees
in the suburbs, and thus brought the central city up by its own bootstraps, then
he would indeed have proved extraordinary skill. But I find it hard to
believe that spending federal funds on a program desired by the economic
notables themselves is a compelling test of ability.20
But enough of New Haven. Who governs the fifty million Americans who
live in other cities of over 100,000? In his preface Dahl notes some dif-
ferences among cities, but he does not make much effort to compare New
Haven with other cities. I would suggest three broad dimensions for comparing
New Haven with other cities. First, and simplest, is the matter of political
institutions, formal and informal.- New Haven has partisan elections, between
highly competitive parties, for a mayor and council. But in the size category
of cities from 100,000 to 500,000 population there are fifty-one cities with
the city-manager system to only forty-three with mayor-council (another six-
teen-half of these in the South-have the commission system),21 Even in
17. Indeed, Dahl indicates at 205 that "the Mayor was firmly convinced that political
success depended on his ability to reach his policy objectives without raising taxes."
18. The former may be a prerequisite to the latter.
19. The mayor was unable to pull off even the very modest maneuver of getting a new
city charter adopted just within New Haven.
20. When a new baseball manager takes over the New York Yankees and wins a
pennant is it amazing skill, or just competent management of vastly superior resources?
The surprising thing about Mayor Lee is that he has not been able to parlay his happy
situation into some higher office-he seems to lack the sense of timing that a Joe Clark
showed when he moved from mayor of Philadelphia to the Senate.
21. See MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 84-87 (1961). Of the twenty-one cities with over
500,000 population, sixteen have the mayor-council system, four have city managers, and
Washington D.C. is a special case. Politically, New Haven may be more similar to some
of these larger cities-or to the national two-party system.
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the minority of cities with the mayor-council system a goodly number hold
non-partisan elections for one or the other, or both. And among those having
partisan elections one-party domination is rather common. Effective two-
party competition (maximizing the importance of the vote and the role of
the lower classes) is not quite unique to New Haven, but neither is it the
"average" situation.22
A second dimension on which cities can be usefully compared is in regard
to their demographic and economic make-up. Lower New England (and New
Haven) have received an influx of immigrants over the past two or three
generations unmatched by any other major part of the country. Connecticut
alone received more immigrants from 1890 to 1900 than did all eleven Southern
states. A variety of common sense city classifications have been put forward
over the past twenty years, most relying on census data relative to occupational
categories.2 A city composed largely of blue-collar manufacturing employees
is likely, ceteris paribus, to differ politically from a regional center with a
high proportion of white-collar employees. Data on the percentage of Negro
population, major ethnic groupings, and religious affiliation are also relevant.
And the question of absentee management or locally owned industry may be of
some importance. Even the simple ratio of per cent of population living
outside the central city to that living within should be a useful index in many
areas (the larger the proportion of population living in the suburbs thie greater
the probability that the ex-plebes dominate-for whatever it may be worth-
the core city).
A third, and perhaps most important point of comparison, is of urban
growth rates. Bernard DeVoto once noted that "New England is a finished
place." But the Whiggish enthusiasm for economic and population growth-
which apparently dominated New Haven during the era of 1840 to 1900
(during which the population increased almost ten-fold)-is now abroad in
much of the land. It is strong in the booming regional centers of the South, the
Southwest, the Pacific Coast, and by no means dead in the Midwest. Thus
from 1950 to 1960 the average rate of population growth for all SMSA's 2
in the four major census divisions of the U.S. was as follows:
West ................ 48.5 per cent
South ................ 36.2 per cent
North Central ......... 23.5 per cent
Northeast ............. 13.0 per cent
22. On the baleful effects of non-partisan elections, see the writings of Charles R. Adrian
or the recent volume by Lan, Tnz PoLiTics OF NO N-PARTiSANSmIP (1960). The classic
treatment of problems of one-party dominance is by V. 0. Key.
23. See, e.g., Harris, A4 Functional Classification of Cities in the United States, 33
GEoG. REv. 86 (1943) ; Nelson, A Service Classification of American Cities, 3 EcoN. GEoG.
189 (1955); or classifications by Victor Jones in MUNxclPAL YEAR BOOK 1953 and 1959
editions.
24. Figures are for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, not just core cities, al-
though speculative ethos of the former is usually reflected in the latter.
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Rates of increase for individual SMSA's ranged as high as 297.9 per cent
(Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood in Florida), with sixty-three of the 212 SMSA's
showing increases of over one-third. When New Haven was booming at a
comparable rate (say from 1840 to 1900) it was the businessmen who were
dominant. One wonders if it is otherwise in those cities that are still in their
"Whig period" and have been less inundated by low-income immigrants.
The last third of Who Governs? shifts from the New Haven scene to con-
sider the general pattern of "pluralist democracy" in which "nearly every
adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials,
and other resources are unequally distributed.. ,,"r Here Dahl evaluates such
potential resources as social standing; the economic elite's access to cash,
credit, and wealth; the public official's legal status, popularity, and patronage
jobs; and the mass media's control over information. 26 By borrowing from
economic theory one can discuss political resources in terms of rates and efficien-
cy of use, ability to transform one resource base (e.g., wealth) into a particular
scope of influence (e.g., politics), and contrast "slack" political systems (most
resources unmobilized) with "tight" political systems.
The points are highly suggestive, and deserve to be worked out more fully.
Economic theory gets interesting when one can move beyond the basic re-
sources (land, labor, and capital) plus a skilled entrepreneur, and begin to
consider problems of organization, industrial structure, and "theory of the
firm." There are, it would seem, political analogies here as well. For large,
complex political orders the institutional structure and patterns of organiza-
tion probably become extremely important. This is a worthy problem for
systematic political theory.
For the moment the pressing need in the study of urban politics is for
middle-range theory to suggest and order hypotheses about "who governs" in
various cities. There is little point in saying it would be nice to have a
hundred more studies like Who Governs?, since we are simply not going to
get them-nor should we. That would be an extremely wasteful use of scarce
academic resources. What we need are a few such probing studies, dealing
with the major "types" of cities. To discover the "types" prior to doing dozens
of studies is the hitch. A good theorist is what is required, the ideal candidate
being Robert A. Dahl.
HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE t
25. P. 1.
26. Importance of the, press probably increases with non-partisan elections, one-party
dominance, or in rapidly growing areas where local ties (and hence other sources of
information) are weak. Thus one would expect the Miami Herald to be more influential in
Dade County than a New Haven paper in New Haven (and such seems to be the case).
tAssociate Professor, Syracuse University.
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